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Abstnαct 
This Pαper α可ues th叫 ， given th e l egα cy of Chiηese communzsm αηd its political struc-
ture , co付uption， together with the threαt of punishment for co付uptwn αnd th e selec tive 
enforcement of this threαt ， serves αsα method of compensαtion thαt both sαtisfies th e politi-
cal obj ectives of the Communist Pαrty αnd provides αn effective inducement to locα1 officials 
to promote economic reform 
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Many observers have suggested that a large part of the success of the Chinese economic 
reform is attributable to the transformation of the typical local government official from 
being an unproductive political entrepreneur prior to reform to being a productive economic 
entrepreneur after reform. As Weiyi時 Zhang and Gang Yi (1996) point out , 
Many reform programs have been initiated by locals and even by the grass-roots , 
and then recognized and adopted as national policies by the central government 
Much of the planning system was dismantled by locals. Many locals have been 
far ahead of their national leaders in reforming the economy. 
Emphasiz呵 the initiatives of local officials , Kang Chen , G. Jefferson , and 1. Singh (1992) 
characterize economic reform in China as being both a top-to-bottom and a bottom-to-top 
process 
At the same time , and apparently paradoxically, both Chinese and foreign observers re-
port that economic reform in China has been associated with an epidemic of corruption 
among local government 0侃CJ悶als. Melan凹 Manion (1997 , page 34) observes that "of the 
54 countries ranked by the Berlin-based public interest organization , Transparency Interna-
tional , according to the prevalence of corruption in 1996 , China ranked 50th: corruption was 
judged more pervasive only in Bangladesh , Kenya , Pakistan , and Nigeria ." 
Taken together these observations are puzzling. How can pervasively corrupt local of-
ficials be the key to the success of economic reform? Furthermore, why do the Chinese 
authorities tolerate widespread corruption among those agents whose performance is essen-
tial to economic reform? 
This paper attempts to answer these questions. We first elaborate on why the actions of 
local officials have been critical in China's economic transition. Then we explore how local 
officials have been motivated to promote economic reform and why the Chinese authorities 
are willing to live with this way of motivating local 0伍cials. Our analysis wiU develop 
the following hypothesis: Becαuse of the legαcy of σ12nese comr月untsm αnd its politicαl 
structure, cor門tp tion ， together 凹的 lhe lhr -eal of punishment for corrupliοηαnd the selec live 
en.f.ο rcement of this threat, serves αsα method of compensαtion thαt both satisfies the politicαJ 
objectives of the Communist Party αnd provides αn ejJective inducement to locα l officials to 
promote economic reform 
In arguing that selective toleration of corruption “works'\ we a re not claiming ei ther that 
all of the widespread corruption that we observe in China is instrumenta l or that corruption is 
not to some extent incidental , in the sense of being a concomitant of economic reform that is 
beyond the power of the authorities to prevent without incurring large costs . We also are not 
claiming that selective toleration of corruption is an optimal method of compensation , eithel 
from the perspective of the Chinese authorit ies of from the perspective of the average Chinese 
person . But , we are claiming that , whether the adopt ion of the policy of selective toleration 
of corrup t ion was active or passive , there a re good reasons for the Chinese authorities to live 
wi th this policy.l 
The idea t hat corruption can facili tate economic development is not new. 2 But , a lthough 
t he literature discusses various positive effects of tolerating corruption , it does not a ddress 
the question of why the authorities li ve wit h a policy of selectively tolerating corruptio丸
when feasible alternatives presumably exist. Writing about contemporary China , Howard 
Davies (1 995 , page 165) points out that “oppo山川ies for corruption arise to a very great 
extent because of t he administrative controls which st ill remain in the Chinese economy and 
because the government of t he PRC has not yet established m echanisms for preventing the 
abuse of these controls". Still , the question remains of why the Chinese authorities have not 
lIn contrast to some literature - 5前， for example, Abhijit Banerjee ( 1997) 一 our analysis does not 
assume that the authoriti臼 have limited ability to punish corruption . We rationali ze tolerance of corruption 
without assuming that the authoriti郎， by imposing sufficiently severe penalties on enough corrupt local 
officials, could not eliminate all or most corruption 
2Samuel Hunti時don (1968) is a classic reference. Francis Lui (1985) provid臼 an example of a formal 
model of the benefits from corruption 
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eliminuted the conditions that breed corruption among local officials 
The Dual-Track Economy and the Role of Local Officials 
Although recognition of the e伍ciency of a market economy relative to central planning 
was an important motivation for the initiation of economic reform in China , the Chinese 
have not as yet completely eliminated central planning as a coordination mechanism for 
production and exchange. Instead , China has adopted a dual-track economy (Shuα句 Gui
Zhi) , which involves the coexistence of central planning with a market mechanism for the 
allocation of resources. Olivier Blanchard and Michael Kremer (1997) argue convinci時ly
that the dual-track economy, preserving elements of central planning, has helped China 
to maintain economic growth during the transition to a market economy. Blanchard and 
Kremer sharply contrast China 's smooth transition to the “disorganization" and associated 
collapse of production during the transition to a market economy in the states of the former 
Soviet Union. Lawrence Lau , Yi時yi Qian , and Gérard Roland (2000) argue further that 
the dual-track economy has provided a way to compensate potential losers from economic 
reform in China 
A criti callegacy of central planning in China , which remains important in the dual-track 
economy, is Guanxi arrangements , whereby "personal connections刊 among government of-
ficials and firm managers control the allocation of resources. Under Guanxi firm managers 
have to maintain good relations with relevant government 0伍cials and managers of other 
firms to ensure the provision of supporting resources (e.g. electricity, water , etc.) and the 
timely delivery of necessary raw materials and intermediate goods. Davies (1995) describes 
how Guαnxi has evolved in China as a response , rooted in Chinese culture, to an underde-
veloped system of property rights and contract law 
In this environment the transformation of local 0伍cials from unproductive political en-
trepreneurs to productive economic entrepreneurs has been critical to the success of Chinese 
economic reform for two apparent reasons: First , because government 。但cials had the high-
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est social and economic status prior to reform , they are likely to include some of the most 
talented people in China. Second, in the dual-track economy, especially with the contin-
ued impo1'tance of Guαnxi ， local officials continue to play an critical 1'ole in coordinating 
production and exchange 
In post-refo1'm China local 0伍cials are often de facto managers. Fo1' example , Jean Oi 
(1995 , 1998) thinks the role of local officials in the economy is so important that she terms 
China 's current political-economic system "local state corporatism刊﹒ As Oi observes (1995 , 
page 1132) , 
The state responsible fo 1' much of this growth is locα1 governments that t 1'eat 
enterprises within their administrative purview as one component of a large cor-
porate whole . Local officials act as the equivalent of a board of directors and 
sometimes more directly as the chief executive officers 
In anothe 1' p1'ovocative study entitled "Local Governments as Indust1'ial Firms ," Andrew 
Walder (1995) argues that local officials in China 's dual-track economy and corpo叫e hier-
archies in a market economy play similar roles in coo1'dinating production and exchange 
Oi claims further that , in response to the new incentives associated with Chinese economic 
reform , local 。而cials not only imp1'oved thei 1' e伍ciency in coordinating production and 
exchange , but they also began actively to play some new roles. 3 According to Oi (1995 , 
pages 1139-1140) , 
Within a local corporatist context local officials turn the administrative bureau-
cracy - of which they are part 一 into a free channel for information and re-
sources to facilitate market production ... Using information and contacts that 
they develop beyond the locality through their routine conduct of administra-
tive work , local officials can provide an array of essential services to their local 
3For other relevant studies of enterprise management in China, see Andrew Walder (1 998) , Jane Duckett 
(1996) , and David Li (1996) 
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enterprises. This might include raw materials , but increasingly, it has become im-
portant for information about new products , technology and markets for fìnished 
goods .. .Iρcal CadleS use their expansive connections and bureaucratic position 
to secure information that wiU serve local economic growth 
What is Corruption? 
It is important to be clear about how we are defìning corruption. On our defìnition cor-
ruption is , in the words of Melanie Manion (1997) ,“the use of public office to pursue private 
gain in ways that violate laws and other formal rules. 刊 We use this legalistic defìnition for 
three reasons: First , this defìnition accords with everyday language. Second, this defìnition 
is used in in the compilation of data and is implicit in quantitative observations about the 
amount of corruption . Third , and most importantly, this defìnition does not prejudge the 
economic consequences of corruption 
Instead of our legalistic defìnition many authors implicitly adopt an economic defìnition 
that equates corruption with purely unproductive rent-seeking activity.4 By abstracting from 
the positive incentive effects that we emphasize , these authors presuppose that corruption 
has only a negative effect on economic performance. In contrast , without denying that some 
of the corruption that we observe iri China involves unproductive rent seeking, we want to 
allow for the possibility that corruption also includes practices that enhance productivity 
Our legalistic defìnition of corruption , which accords with everyday speech and with measures 
of corruption , does not preclude the conclusion that tolerance of corruption can promote 
economic reform and improved economic performance 
Manion (1997) associates corruption in China with two general practices: One practice 
involves local officials who exploit their positions to extract bribes or to arrange nepotisti c 
favors . This practice is often referred to as tαnwu shouhui in Chinese. The other practice 
4S間 ， for example, Dan Usher (1 992) , Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vish叮 (1993) ， and Isaac Ehrlich and 
Francis Lui (1999) 
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involves local officials who misappropriate public property or public funds for personal ben-
efit. Examples include the use of public property or public funds to obtain lavish housing 
and fancy cars or to travel abroad. This practice is often referred to as nuoyong goηgkuαn 
in Chinese 
Corruption as a Method of Compensation 
What has motivated local 0伍cials to become efficient economic entrepreneurs? More 
completely, what have been the incentives for local 。而cials to promote economic reform , 
and what has been the system of rewards and punishments through which these incentives 
have been implemented? 
Some recent literature argues out that a positive relation between the economic perfor-
mance of a region and local tax revenue provides local Chinese officials with incentives to 
promote economic reform and growth. For example , Susan Shirk (1993) claims that "fiscal 
decentralization is the ‘cornerstone ' of China 's economic reform . 刊 In an interesting compar-
ative study, Roger Gordon and David Li (1997) claim that local officials have much more 
strongly supported new non-state firms in China than in Russia , because local governments 
can obtain revenue from taxes on new entrants in China , but not in Russia 
The existing literature, however, does not adequately address the critical question of ho \V 
localo伍cials themselves benefit from the increased revenue in their administrative region 
Although Oi , Walder , and other observers emphasize the role of local officials in coordinating 
production and exchange and in providing information about new products , technology, and 
markets , their writings do not explain how the Chinese local 0伍cials are compensated for 
these essential services 
As Jane D 
formal employees of firms. Then how do the firms compensate these officials? Two practices 
suggest themselves: the extraction of bribes or nepotistic favors (tαm山 sho的ui) and the 
appropriation of public property or public funds for personal benefit (nuoyong gongkuαηj 
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Both of these practices are forms of corruption. In fact , fiscal decentralization facilit ates 
both of these form s of cOLTuption , and the Chinese authorities have vigorously promoted 
fiscal decentralizati on. Both of these observations are consistent with our view that much of 
the corruption that we observe in China is instrumental 
The Economic Function of Corruption 
Does selective toleration of corruption provide an effective inducement to local 0伍cials to 
promote economic reform? To motivate local 0伍cials ， who are its agents , the Chinese central 
government , as principal , would like to reward behavior that contributes to good economic 
results and to punish behavior that contributes to bad economic results. But , the central 
government cannot perfectly monitor the efforts of local 0伍cials. Given their better access 
to informa tion , loca l 。而cials often are able to conceal from the central government that a 
good outcome resulted from good luck rather than from extra effort or that a bad outcome 
resulted from poor e叮or t rather than from bad luck. Local officials naturally will exaggerate 
both the importance of their e旺。rts in producing a good outcome and the importance of bad 
luck in producing a bad outcome 
As Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti (1996 , 1999) argue , the problems of incom-
plete information and asymmetric information between principal and agent , which compli-
cate many principal -agent relations , are probably even more severe in poor and developing 
economies like China than in Western economies. The extensive literature on the principal-
agent problem generally concludes that , although incomplete and asymmetric information 
compli cates the design of incentive schemes , Western economies have invented and imple-
mented methods of compensati on that work reasonably well to motivate agents. As this 
li terature expla ins , incomplete and asymmetric information lead the principa l both to de-
centralize the de termination of compensation and to share the profits and losses of the 
enterpri se with the agent. 5 
5 Edward Lazear (1 995) provides a comprehensive su附y of this li terature 
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The important observation is that in China the use of corruption as a me t. hod of com-
pensation embodies a decentralized compensation scheme and a sharing of pro fì. ts and losses 
in much the same way as methods of compensation implemented in \Vestern economies 
Corruption , whether in the form of 的nW1L shou/wi or n1wyong gongk1L an, mitigates the prob-
lem of measuring and monitoring economic performance because those local 0伍cials who 
make the largest economic contribution are likely to be able to extract the largest bribes or 
nepotistic favors or to have the most valuable public property to appropriate. Also , the com-
pensation that local officials obtain through corruptio九 particularly in the form of bribery, 
is paid directly by local firms , which have the best information on the performance of local 
o伍cials
Importantly, the Chinese authorities have eschewed the explicit implementation of meth司
ods of compensation commonly used in Western economies to solve the problems of incom-
plete and asymmetric information. Nominally the incomes of local 。而cials are fixed and 
unrelated to their performance. The fact that the Chinese authorities have not instituted 
any alternative mechanism for providing appropriate incentives to local 0伍cials is consistent 
with ourγiew that much of the corruption that we observe in China is instrumental 
Political Advantages of Corruption as a Method of Compensation 
That selective toleration of corruption is a workable solution to the problems of incom-
plete and asymmetric information by itself does not explain why the Chinese authorities are 
willing to live with this policy. It is also important that political considerations mitigate 
against the implementation in China of incentive schemes and associated methods of com-
pensation used in Western economies. G These political considerations are both a legacy of 
the strategies adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in establishing its rule and a prod-
6In cOlltrast Daron Acemoglu and Th凹ry Ve山er (1998) suggest a purely economic rationale for the 
existence of corruption in the presence of asymmetric information. In their model corruption is incidental , 
in the sense of being too costly for the authorities to prevent , rather than instrumental 
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lIct of the Party 's goal of maintaining its cohesiveness and absolllte political power , which 
continlles to yield large benefits to Party members 
Most importantly, lIsing selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensation 
creates a sitllation in which the Party hierarchy always “has something刊 on most Party 
members and local officials. As Susan Shirk observes (1993 , page 144) , 
Because an individual knows that higher-ups could charge him with corruption 
at any time , lack of exposure is in effect special treatment for which the official 
gratefully exchanges his political support 
Using selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensation enhances the control 
of the P arty hierarchy over Party members and local 。而cials and helps the Party hierarchy 
to maintai n its political power while it is decentralizing economic decision making 
Other political considerations also may be relevant. For example , Party propaganda has 
always claimed that every member of the Chinese Communist Party is a sel fl.ess “public 
servant of the people" . Even today the Party 's General Secretary, Jiang Zemin , admonishes 
his compatriots “to learn from the sel fl.ess example of Lei Feng刊 An expli cit system of 
material incentives and rewards for local officials , most of whom are Party members , would 
be inconsistent with this propaganda and with the myth of the benevolent nature of the 
Party 
In addition , although many government officials and Party members play important eco-
nomic roles in China 's dllal-track economy, many others , including many of those connected 
with the army, are responsible only for political , military, and other non-economic activities 
An explicit system of material incentives and rewards for economic performance would un-
dermine the political and social standing of those government officials and Party members 
who are not involved in economic activities. The Communist Party, like any political organi-
zation , is a potentially fragi le coalition , and jealousy and dis content , especially in the army, 
would threaten its cohesiveness. The use of selective toleration of corruption as a method of 
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compensation , by avoiding exp1icit compensation of 10ca1 offi cia1s for good l'runomir perfur-
mance , helps to preserve the p01itica1 and socia1 standing of those government 。而cia1s and 
Party members who are not contributing direct1y to the success of economir refolln 
Punishment of Corruption 
Manion (1997) provides a detai1ed description of the apparent e叮Orts uf th佇 Chinese
centra1 government to contr01 corruption. A1though Manion con fì. rms repor t.s of severe P\ In-
ishment , and even execution , of corrupt 。而cia1s ， she a1so con fì. rms the ob的 vation t. hat en-
for cement of anticorruption measures has been high1y se1ec t. ive . As Shirk pυmtsυ Ilt. (199 :1 , 
pages 143-144) , “Despite all the ta1k about corruption , Party and governmcnt 1eaders haw 
punished few corrupt officia1s 刊
The threat of punishment for corruption together wi t. h th e se1ective enf()tTem f'l\ t of thi s 
threat apparent1y serves two purposes . First , with 自sca1 decentra1ization and with ruttllp t. iotl 
as a method of compensation 10ca1 officia1s proximate1y determine their 0\\'11 rompcnsa t. iυn 
To make this system work e叮ective1y the Party authorities must deter 10ca1 (J fficia1s from be-
ing excessive1y corrupt 一- that is , from appropriating for themse1ves more t. han the amount 
to which they are entitled. Second, in order for the use of corruption as a method of compen-
sation to enhance the Party 's hierarchica1 contr01 structure , the Party authorities must show 
that they are willing to punish any corrupt 0伍cia1 whose p01itica1 allegiance has become 
suspect 
If se1ective t01eration of corruption is to provide appropriate incentives , t. hen it mus t. be 
the case that the more effort that a 10ca1 officia1 makes to promote good economic resu1ts the 
1ess 1ike1y he is to be punished for corruption. There are reasons to expect the administration 
of punishment for corruption to work in this way. Most importantly, the more inrome t. hat 
an efficient but corrupt 10ca1 officia1 generates for his region , the more va1uab1e he is to the 
citizens of his region and to the central government , both of whom share il1 thisνrospert t.y ， 
and the greater is the chance that any potentia1 rep1acement for this corrupt 1υca1 officia1 wiU 
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n υ t perfυ叫rm a臼s well. Th孔叫us丸， even if a local 0 侃c1 a叫l '冶s corrupt behav叫10r IS re叭1
l昀s t. he economi c 1νJe剖rfOl口mη1an ce 0叫f h圳11S r閃'egIOn九1川， the more likely t仙ha叫t the cent仇i九ral government will 
aostain from pun ishing h im , beyond perhaps a slap on the hand. In contrast , cOrrllpt local 
officials who seem easily replaceable , or , more generally, whose corrupt behavior is ou t of 
proportion to their perceived value , are likely to be the hapless victims of crackdowns on 
corruptIOn 
In addition , the more income that an efficient but corrupt local official generates for hi s 
region , the more he can appropriate for himself while sti ll leaving enough fruits of progress 
for ordinnry people to assuage their natural jealousy of his privileged position. Accordingly>
t. he oetter the economi c performance of his region , the less likely are ordinary people to 
sqlleal on a corrupt loca l offi cia l or to complain about him. In contrast , a corrupt local 
υ而 rial \\'h ose region 's economic performance is poor is likely to encounter popular pressure 
to Pllnish him . 1n SI I帆 although ， as Shirk notes (1993 , page 144) ,“Laxi ty toward official 
COITllp tJ υ11 can be viewed as a side payment to officials to give them a personal stake in 
refurm刊， selective punishment of corruption is essential to both the credibili ty and e伍c1 ency
of the use of corruption as a method of compensation 
Future Prospects 
Our analysis of selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensat ion in China 
has focused on the strategic interactions between Party authorities , acting t hrough t he cen-
t ral govemment , and the local 0伍cials who , given the legacy of Chinese central planninιare 
efft'r t. ivel!' responsib le fυr promoting economic reform. We have viewed the central govern-
ment as t he principal who determines the compensation scheme for local officia ls. The main 
implicatiun of our analys is has been that corruption , together with the threat of punishment 
for corrllpti on and t he select ive enforcement of th is t hreat , serves as a method of compe~­
sat ion tha t both sa t. isnes t he ν ol i t i ca l objectives of the Communist P arty and provides an 
efft'rtive il1 ducemen t. to lucal officials to promote economic reform 
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As evidence for our claim that much of the corruption that we observe in China is ins t. rll-
mental rather than incidental, we have pointed to three other aspects of Chinese ('conomic 
policy that complement and support the use of corruption as a method of ∞mpensatlOn 
First , the Chinese authorities have actively promoted the fìscal decentralization t.hat cre-
ates the opportunity for corruption by local offìcials. Second , the Chinese allthorities have 
not instituted any alternative mechanism for providing incentives to local offìcials. Third , 
the enforcement of anticorruption measures , including punishments for corrllption , has been 
highly selective 
What does our analysis imply for the future course of China's economic refonn? The 
credibility and effectiveness of a compensation scheme that involves the t. hreat IIf pll l\ i 只 hmcnl
for corruption and the selective enforcement of this thrent Je jJC' nd cri tic[\ 1 hυn 1' \11 h the 
central government 's reputation for reliability and its s llr v i\'只 1 probauility. If t.!w 叭叭'int!
prospects of the current central government were to becom C' \lI1 cC' rtain , ancl If loc l\ l oflìci[\1s 
were to anticipate that regardless of their economic per fÚllllnnc C' they ha\ ' ，、[\ S川 1St nnt I 只 l
probability of being replaced as a result of political changes , then the thrent IJf pll l\ ishmcnt 
would be unlikely to deter them from engaging in excessive co rrllpti on. This ouservation 
suggests that the success of the Chinese model of economi c reform , a model that is itself a 
product of the Communist Party 's goal of maintaining its rohesiveness and nlJsυ1111 1' Pυlitiral 
power , has depended on the Party 's ab ility to ach ieve this gonl. lf t. he futulρlni ngs th rea ts 
either to the stability of the Party 's hierarchy 0 1' to its monopoly of politiral po\\'凹， then 
China will have to 且nd another way to support economi c incen t. ives and to maintain t'cυnOlnlC 
growth during the transi tion to a market economy 
In any event , there is widespread agreement that China 's current dual-trnrk economy is a 
transitional state that will evolve in the future into a predominantly market ecυnom~'. B叭 ， as 
we have observed , selective toleration of corruption as a method of compensat. iυn is associated 
with the critical role played by local 0伍cials in the dual-track economy. J> 1l'sU Inl\lJ IYI the 
evolution towards a market economy will imply a decrease in the impo r t.nnceυf (,'rumxi , 
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an associated decrease in the economic importance of local officials , and a transition to 
methods of compensation similar to those implemented in Western economies . China 's 
prospective entry into the \月vorld Trade Organization is likely to accelerate these tendencies 
How economi cally and JJoliti cally disruptive these changes will be remains to be seen 
13 
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